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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAY & NIGHT HEATING COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
C. M. RUFF, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10811 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Day & Night Heating 
Company, Inc., performed services under a contract with 
Reed S. Tew, a general contractor, for construction of a 
home on land belonging to Defendant, C. M. Ruff. 
The contractor failed to pay a balance of $930.00 and 
the Plaintiff brought this action based on Title 14-2-1 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and Title 14-2-2 Utah Code 
Armotated, 1953. This action was brought for the reason-
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able value of materials furnished and labor performed by 
the Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint was filed in the Lower Court 
on September 9th, 1966 (R-1, 2), and an answer was filed 
on October 21st, 1966 (R-3, 4). A motion for judgment on 
a pleadings was filed on December 2nd, 1966 (R-7) with 
a notice calling the same for a hearing on December 7th, 
1966 (R-8). On December 7th, 1966, at the time of the 
hearing, counsel for the Defendant filed a memorandum 
in support of his motion (R-9, 10, 11, 12). Counsel for 
Plaintiff evidently had no opportunity to file a written 
answering memorandum. Judgment of dismissal was en-
tered by the Court on the 8th day of December, 1966 (R-
13) after having heard the argument of counsel. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Lower 
Court and for trial of the questions of fact raised in the 
pleadings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is the owner of the 
property located on 1370 Fillmore Street in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and that the Defendant contracted with one 
Reed S. Tew as a general contractor for the construc-
tion of improvements on that property. The Plaintiff per-
formed improvements on the property and was not paid 
in full for said improvements consisting of material and 
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labor, and the balance of $930.00 was and still is due and 
owing (R-1, 2). 
Title 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as fol-
lows: 
"14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
-The owner of any interest in land entering into a 
contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the construc-
tion, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any build-
ing, structure or improvement upon land shall, be-
fore any such work is commenced, obtain from the 
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned 
for the faithful performance of the contract and 
prompt payment for material furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest 
may appear; and any person who has furnished ma-
terials or performed labor for or upon any such 
building, structure or improvement, payment for 
which has not been made, shall have a direct right of 
action against the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor 
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the 
prices agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue 
forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or 
default in the performance, of the work provided for 
in the con tract. 
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to 
any person interested, upon request." 
Title 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was amended 
in the 36th regular session of the Legislature in such a 
manner as to become Law on the 15th day of May, 1965, 
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with the amended provision. Before amendment, the stat-
ute read as follows: 
"14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability.-
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient 
bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall 
be personally liable to all persons who have fur-
nished materials or performed labor under the con-
tract for the reasonable value of such materials fur-
nished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, 
in any case the prices agreed upon." 
After amendment the following words were added: 
"actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced 
within one year from the last date the last materials were 
furnished or labor performed." 
The last materials provided and labor performed was 
on or about December 1st, 1964. Plaintiff's Complaint was 
filed on September 9th, 1966. At the time materials and 
labor were provided, Plaintiff contends that the Three 
Year Statute of Limitations would apply, pursuant to 
Title 78-12-26 ( 4) which reads: 
"78-12-26. Within three years.-Within three years: 
... ( 4) An action for a liability created by the stat-
utes of this State, "other than for a penalty or for a 
forfeiture under the Laws of this State, except 
wherein special cases a different limitation is pre-
scribed by the Statutes of this State." 
A few months following the provision of labor and ma-
terials but within the then existing statute of limitations, 
the 36th Legislature of the State of Utah provided for a 
one year statute of limitations on actions brought under 
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Title 14-2-2. QUERY: Whether the Three Year Statute of 
Limitations in existence at the time the material and 
labor were supplied governs the case or whether the one 
year statute of limitations provided by the Legislature 
in the interim period should govern. 
The Defendant further claims that the remedy pro-
vided for the Plaintiff under Title 14-2-2 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, effects and works a penalty and that the 
statute of limitations on a penalty is limited to one year: 
''78-12-29. Within one year: ... 
( 2) An action upon a statute for a penalty for for-
feiture where the action is given to an individual or 
to an individual and estate, except when the statute 
imposing it prescribes a different limitation." 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
LEGISLATION OCCURRING DURING THE RUNNING 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BUT PRIOR TO 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAVING EXPIRED, 
WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE STATUTE OF LIM-
ITATIONS, IS PROSPECTIVE AND NOT RETROSPEC-
TIVE. 
Vol. 34 American Jurisprudence, Limitation of Actions, 
Sec. 43 states: 
"Although as already has been noted, it is within the 
power of the Legislature to create a statute of limita-
tions, or to change the period of limitation previously 
fixed, and to make such statute or changes applicable 
to existing causes of action, provided a reasonable 
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time is given by the new Law for the commencement 
of suit before the bar takes effect. Nevertheless, a 
statute changing the limitation is not ordinarily con-
strued as having a retrospective effect. On the con-
trary, in most jurisdictions statutes of limitations are 
construed as prospective and not retrospective in 
their operation; in the absence of the clear Legisla-
tive intent to the contrary, and the presumption is 
against any intent on the part of the Legislature to 
make such a statute retrospective. It has been said 
that words of a statute ought not to have a retrospec-
tive operation unless they are so clear, strong and 
imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to 
them, or unless the intention of the Legislature can-
not otherwise be satisfied." 
"All authorities appear to approve of the rule that 
statutes will be presumed to have been intended by 
the Legislature to be prospective and not retrospec-
tive in their action where a retrospective effect 
would work injustice and disturb rights acquired 
under the former Law . . . " 
The retrospective effect of statutes relating to causes 
of action for debt depended upon a prior statute is an-
notated in American Law Reports, Vol. 77 pp. 1338 and 
1340 wherein it is stated: 
"Even though the Legislature may have the power 
to enact retrospective laws, a construction which 
gives to a statute a retrospective operation is not 
favored, and such effect will not be given unless it is 
distinctly expressed or clearly and necessarily im-
plied that the statute is to have a retrospective ef-
fect ... " 
Page 1347 ibid, states: 
7 
"An amendment to a statute which changes the pe-
riod of limitation within which an action for debt 
may be brought has been held not to apply to pend-
ing actions." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has held with 
respect to the retrospective and prospective construction 
of statutes with the general rule stated by most of the 
authorities, namely: 
"Statutes should operate prospectively only unless 
the words employed show a clear intention that they 
should have a retrospective effect. This rule of con-
struction of statutes should always be adhered to un-
less there is something on the face of the statute put-
ting it beyond doubt that the Legislature meant to 
operate retrospectively." 
This is found in Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Com-
pany vs. Spry, Supreme Court of Utah, March 14th, 1898, 
16 Utah 222, 52 Pacific 382. 
This same rule of Law is repeated in re Ingraham's 
Estate, Peterson vs. State Tax Commission, 148 Pacific 
2nd. 340, 106 Utah 337; and in McCary vs. Utah State 
Teachers' Retirement Board, et al, 177 Pacific 2nd 725, 
111 Utah 257; also 77 Pacific 2nd 725, 111 Utah 251 and 
Elizabeth B. Archer, Plaintiff and Appellant vs. Utah 
State Land Board, 392 Pacific 2nd, 15 Utah 2nd 321. 
In each of the foregoing cases the Court sustained the 
general rule in the Ingraham's Estate case. There the 
Court stated: 
"That this Court is committed to the general rule 
cannot be questioned, for in the case of Mercer Gold 
Mining & Milling Company vs. Spry, 16 Utah 22, 52 
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Pacific 382, Judge Miner said: 'Constitutions as well 
as statutes should operate prospectively only unless 
the words employed show a clear intention that they 
should have a retrospective effect. This rule of con-
struction should always be adhered to unless there is 
something on the face of the statute putting it beyond 
doubt that the Legislature meant it to operate retro-
spectively.' " 
There do not appear to be any cases in the State of 
Utah which are directly in point as to determining the 
effect of the foregoing cited rule on a statute of limita-
tions problem. However, if the general rule is applied, it 
would appear that the statute of limitations newly en-
acted would be prospective in application and not retro-
spective. 
In an Arizona case, Curtis, et al vs. Boquillas Land & 
Cattle Co., states the general rule: 
"Upon few if any branches of the Law is there such a 
contrariety of view expressed by the Courts as upon 
the effect to be given new statutes of limitation upon 
causes of action existing at the time the statutes go 
into effect. The general rule applied to such statutes 
is that they will not be given a retrospective effect 
unless it clearly appears that the Legislature so in-
tended.'' 
The Court further stated, quoting Greland vs. Town of 
Burgen, 34 New Jersey Law 438: 
"That an act which merely limited the time within 
which an action may be brought does not apply to 
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a suit which though commenced after the passage 
of the act was pending at the time the same took ef-
fect. The logic of this rule is apparent, particularly 
when applied to the case like the one Bar where the 
action was begun before the act took effect, and at 
the time no other statute of limitations was in force 
as to such actions. Under no cannon of construction 
can a rule giving a retrospective effect to new stat-
utes of limitations be made to apply to the case at 
Bar." 
In 53 Corpus Juris Secundum, Limitations of Actions, 
Section 4(d), it is stated: 
''In the absence of language making such construc-
tion necessary, an act of limitation will not be con-
strued so as to make it apply to actions p~nding, or 
to defenses that have been pleaded at the time the 
statute goes into effect, particularly where the stat-
ute, if given a retrospective effect, will absolutely bar 
the action at the date of the passage of the act, and a 
statute which merely limits the time within which an 
action may be brought is not susceptible of a con-
struction which will make it apply to a suit pending 
at a time such act takes effect, although the suit is 
commenced after the passage of the act, especially 
where at the time the action was brought there was 
no other statute in force as to such actions. It has 
been held that an act expressly alluding to rights of 
action accrued before it took effect will not embrace 
actions pending at the time of its passage." 
This is the case at Bar. The Legislature, in placing a 
statute of limitations of one year on the provisions of 
Title 14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, recognized the 
existing and continuing causes of action in existence at 
the time of the passage of the statute, and therefore tac-
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itly recognized the continuing effect of causes of action 
in existence but not filed when the legislation was passed. 
It has been argued that there is, in effect, a postpone-
ment of operation of a time for the statute to take effect, 
that it ordinarily evidences a legislative intent to make 
any statute of retrospective effect. 
In the State of Utah the postponement of the effective 
date of the statute herein referred to, occurs not because 
of any specific intent on the part of the Legislature to 
grant notice and an opportunity for all parties to take 
action before the new statute of limitations would take 
effect, but occurs because of a constitutional provision in 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Constitution of 
the State of Utah, Article 6, Sec. 25: 
"All acts shall be officially published and no act shall 
take effect until so published nor until sixty days 
after the adjournment of the session at which it 
passed unless the Legislature, by a vote of two-thirds 
of all the members elected to each house, shall other-
wise direct." 
Point 2 
THAT THE APPLICATION OF TITLE 14-2-2 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS NOT A PENALTY. 
Title 78-12-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
"78-12-29. Within one year: ... 
(2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or for-
feiture where the action is given to an individual, or 
to an individual and estate, except when the statute 
imposing it prescribes a different limitation." 
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It is the Defendant Respondent's position that a right of 
action accruing under Title 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, is a penalty. 
A similar statute to the Utah Statute is found in Vol. 28, 
United States Code Annotated Sec. 2462 which reads as 
follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, 
an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of 
any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or 
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless com-
menced within five years from the date when the 
claim first accrued if, within the same period, the 
offender or the property is found within the United 
States in order that proper service may be made 
thereon.'' 
The two statutes, although in different verbal form, 
nevertheless constitute the same type of a prohibition 
reflecting the reluctance of Courts to impose penalties 
and forfeitures. 
The United States Supreme Court has construed a pen-
alty in the case of Meeker vs. Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Company, Pennsylvania 1915, 35 Supreme Court 328, 236 
U. S. 412, 59 Law Edition 644, as follows: 
"Section 2462 (formerly 791) which places a limita-
tion of five years upon any suit or prosecution for 
any penalty or forfeiture pecuniary or otherwise ac-
cruing under the Laws of the United States, the 
words penalty or forfeiture in this section refer to 
something imposed in a punitive way for an infrac-
tion of a public law and do not include a liability im-
posed for the purpose of redressing a private injury, 
even though the wrongful act be a public offense and 
punishable as such." 
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In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works vs. Atlanta, 
Tennessee, 1906, 27 Supreme Court 65, 203 U. S. 390, 51 
Law Edition, 241, the Court held that treble damages re-
covering under Section 1 of Title 15 for a violation of 
Anti-Trust Laws Section 1 of Title 15 are compensatory 
damages and are not in the nature of a penalty or for-
feiture, and hence time for commencement of action to 
recover such damages is limited by applicable state stat-
ute and not by this section. 
The State of Kansas has made a similar holding with 
respect to a statute of limitations governing penalties in 
the State of Kansas. In Frame vs. Ashley, 59 Kansas 477 
and 478, 53 Pacific 474 and 475, the three years statute of 
limitations was held to apply to an action against a bank 
officer for receiving deposits in an insolvent bank where 
the purpose of the action was for recovery of the deposit. 
The sole question there was whether the action was upon 
a liability created by statute or upon a statute for penalty 
or forfeiture. In the opinion it was said: 
"The general rule is that a statutory obligation to pay 
damages which the common law does not give is a 
liability created by statute where the damages 
awarded are limited to compensation and are limited 
to an amount which makes the injured party whole. 
The general rule also is that a statutory obligation to 
pay an amount beyond compensation, to submit to 
more than simple redress of the wrong done, to pay 
not merely in respect of the deserts of the injured 
person but as punishment for a wrong doing is a 
penalty.'' 
Referring to the statute giving a mortgagor the right 
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to recover $100.00 for failure to release a satisfied mort-
gage, the opinion said: 
''There is no analogy between these statutes and the 
one under consideration. The latter gives compensa-
tion, nothing more, and permits nothing less. The 
former gi\·es a fixed sum, irrespective of the damages 
actually sustained. Damages from failure to enter 
satisfaction of a mortgage may be very great. It may 
be that none whatever occurred. Whether great or 
small. or none at all, the amount recoverable is fixed 
arbitrarily at $100.00." 
The conclusion reached was that the statute imposed a 
liability for compensation only, that it was remedial and 
therefore not barred by the one year statute of limita-
tions. This is comparable to Title 14-2-2, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, which should therefore not be barred by 
the one year statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Law of the State of Utah has recognized the ma-
jority ruling that legislative acts are to be given prospec-
tive interpretation except where the Legislature has 
clearly indicated otherwise. The application of this rule 
of Law would require that the three year statute of lim-
itation be applied in the case at Bar. 
The cases also appear to support the proposition that 
pending actions are not affected by a Law changing the 
applicable statute of limitation. 
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The Plaintiff therefore prays that the Order of the Dis-
trict Court dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, be reversed 
and that the case be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKINS, PACE & WATKINS 
Lorin N. Pace 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
